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With a coalition agreement finally reached, Angela Merkel’s
grand coalition is now in the hands of SPD members
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Following lengthy negotiations in the aftermath of September’s German federal elections, a coalition
agreement was finally reached last week. Patricia Hogwood assesses the gains and losses for the
leading party of government, the CDU/CSU, and their prospective coalition partner, the SPD. She
writes that the vague wording of the coalition contract and a raft of transitional measures, selective
application and conditions mean that both parties can stake a claim to being the ‘party of social
justice’ – the issue of greatest concern to the voting public. However, with Angela Merkel at the
helm, key cabinet positions and future policy strategy are likely to remain in the hands of the CDU.
After two months of intense negotiations, Germany’s incumbent Chancellor Angela Merkel unveiled
a new coalition agreement between her Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) and Germany’s main opposition
party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Branded by Merkel as ‘a Grand Coalition with great responsibilities for
Germany’, the formal 185-page agreement ‘Forging Germany’s Future’ sets out the broad aims of the new
government’s policy agenda, but leaves much of the detail to be hammered out in future through the coalition
committee.
Although the CDU/CSU flirted with the Green Party as a
potential partner, it was always likely that a coalition
straddling the neoliberal, pro-growth economic positions
of the CDU and the sustainability agenda of the Greens
would be unworkable in the current economic climate
and under current party leaderships. The ‘Grand
Coalition’ solution of a government made up of
Germany’s two main parties was the only real option, in
spite of a distinct lack of enthusiasm from the respective
party followers and the dubious democratic credentials
of a system with no viable opposition in parliament.
Negotiations between the CDU and its main rival were
never going to be easy. After an unhappy experience of
Grand Coalition in 2005-9 and a humiliating election
defeat, SPD party chair Sigmar Gabriel would have to
present the party base with significant gains to justify
another coalition under the leadership of Angela Merkel.
With the added leverage afforded by the lack of
alternative options in parliament, the SPD held out for a deal that has secured two of their key domestic policy aims:
a national minimum wage and a right to dual citizenship for children of immigrant parents.
The SPD have pushed through their main campaign pledge: to introduce a minimum wage of €8.50 per hour across
the board, replacing the current system of sectoral negotiations over wages. However, thanks to transitional
measures in the implementation of the agreement, the SPD party may not gain as much direct voter recognition for
this initiative as they would have hoped. Under the deal, the new statutory minimum wage will be introduced across
the country by 1 January 2015 and selected existing wage agreements that do not meet the €8.50 minimum
threshold may run until the end of December 2016. While many east German workers’ take-home pay will rise when
regional disparities are ironed out, conservative critics fear that, by losing the right to negotiate lower wages, east
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German industry may lose one of its few competitive advantages, leading potentially to economic decline and higher
unemployment in the region.
The SPD’s failure to push through another plank of their social justice programme may further dent their hopes of
presenting themselves to the public as the coalition’s social conscience. The SPD launched the election campaign
with a complementary demand for a package of tax hikes  for top-band tax payers and the super-rich. However, their
vacillation over this issue as the campaign progressed weakened their negotiating position and they had to back
down.
This leaves them with the options of pursuing a policy of tax savings through closing avoidance loopholes at home
and lobbying for tighter financial and fiscal regulation within the EU – including the outlawing of tax havens. While
this may not strike the same chord with the public as a high-profile wealth tax, the SPD may still be pleased to take
ownership of this issue at EU level if only to leave perceived responsibility for the Eurozone crisis and an anticipated
third Greek bailout with the CDU/CSU.
The CDU and particularly the more conservative CSU have traditionally regarded dual citizenship as inadmissible in
principle, believing it is inconsistent with a commitment to German-ness and inimical to integration and internal
security.  In this context, the SPD’s success in securing a right to dual citizenship for second- and subsequent
generation immigrants was a considerable achievement. A further concession to the SPD is the reduction in the
minimum pension age to 63 for those who have paid into a pension plan for 45 years. Merkel’s initiative for a better
pension for mothers and child-carers also appears in the coalition agreement, establishing her social justice
credentials.
Overall, ownership of the coalition deal seems to be weighted in favour of the CDU. General Secretary Hermann
Gröhe claimed with glee, ‘The CDU’s fingerprints are all over this deal’. The party’s economic priorities take pride of
place and are set out in greater detail than other areas. They include maintaining a sound financial policy; promoting
prosperity (without the hindrance of a wealth tax); investing in transport infrastructure; and moving toward clean
energy.
Wider implications for German domestic and European policy will depend on the distribution of cabinet seats in the
new government. The coalition agreement itself has nothing to say on this matter: a disclaimer notes only that this
will be determined by the coalition parties. It is anticipated that the new cabinet will comprise six CDU ministers, six
from the SPD and three from the CSU, the CDU’s Bavarian sister-party.
The next step comes on 6 December, when members of the SPD party base are to vote on the coalition contract. If
all goes smoothly, Merkel could be formally re-elected as Chancellor as early as 17 December. If the SPD
membership should reject the deal, the options are limited. The CDU could resume its talks with the Greens to forge
what is likely to be a short-lived, unsatisfactory experimental CDU/CSU-Green federal coalition. If attempts to find a
majority for a Merkel government fail, the federal President will call for fresh elections.
One recent sobering opinion poll has indicated that only 50 per cent of those questioned actively supports the Grand
Coalition, with 31 per cent against it. If the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition does get underway, the new Merkel
government’s first challenge will be to restore the confidence of the German public.
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